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LAWFARE OR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS? 
Dr. Gregory P. Noone* 
This essay attempts to trace the evolution of the term ―Lawfare.‖  
Major General Dunlap inserted lawfare into our legal lexicon over a dec-
ade ago as a tool to communicate themes to military commanders. Howev-
er, since that time it has primarily taken two divergent paths.  One as Dun-
lap intended—as a discussion of applying legal pressure on the other side of 
a conflict, and the other as a derogatory term with an ideological goal. This 
essay also addresses lawfare and its potential relationship to ―Strategic 
Communications‖ with an extensive discussion regarding this umbrella 
term and all it encompasses. Finally, this essay poses the question of wheth-
er there is a legitimate versus illegitimate—or put another way—a legal 
versus illegal—lawfare construct. Ultimately, lawfare provides for the use 
and understanding of the law and especially the need to emphasize the 
pragmatic utility of the law to military commanders in an ideologically neu-
tral way. 
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           I.  DUNLAP‘S LAWFARE  
Lawfare, as originally conceived in the late 1990s by retired Major 
General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., of the U.S. Air Force, was an ideological 
neutral term describing an effects-based operation ―where the effect created 
is the focus, not necessarily the means of obtaining it.‖1 In other words, 
lawfare was a way to apply legal pressure on the other side of a conflict, 
often times, but not always, in conjunction with military operations, which 
then potentially forced the enemy to defend themselves in multiple arenas. 
The concept was designed for an initial audience of military commanders so 
that they could better understand the role and potential contribution of the 
military lawyers (judge advocates—commonly referred to as JAGs).2 Major 
General Dunlap provides numerous examples of lawfare. Chief among them 
is the U.S. Government‘s legal purchase of all the relevant commercial im-
agery prior to military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 in order to deprive 
actual and potential enemies from obtaining and using such information.3 
Major General Dunlap also cites sanctions as the single most important 
weapon in debilitating the Iraqi air force and the choking off of financial 
support of terrorist networks and insurgencies as effective lawfare.4 
However, sometimes an effort to use lawfare can backfire. As used 
against the United States and our allies in Afghanistan it had great effect 
when our military leadership made public the very restrictive rules of en-




 1 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L. AFF. 146, 147 
(2008). 
 2 Id. at 149–50. Dunlap explains that ―[k]nowing the military client‘s ‗business,‘ so to 
speak, is essential for lawfare practitioners.‖ (emphasis in original).   
 3 See Robert K. Ackerman, Commercial Imagery Aids Afghanistan Operations, SIGNAL 
MAGAZINE, Dec. 2001, http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_ 
Template.asp?articleid=298&zoneid=84 (The U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
purchased exclusive use agreements of all imagery of the Afghanistan region from Space 
Imaging). See also Theresa Hitchens, Vice President, Center for Defense Information, Pres-
entation to a Space Security Conference: U.S. Space Operations in the International Context 
(Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2111 
(explaining that the reason NIMA bought exclusive rights to all images over Afghanistan 
was primarily to ―keep pictures of the operations out of the hands of the news media‖ and to 
find ways to ―block transfer of commercial imagery to enemies during wartime‖). 
 4 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st—Century Conflicts?, 54 
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 34, 36 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? 
AD=ADA515192&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (describing sanctions as a method to 
―isolate insurgencies from the external support many experts believe is essential to victory‖).   
 5 Kristi Keck, U.S. Must Win Afghan Hearts and Minds, Commander Says, CNN (Sept. 
28, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-28/politics/afghanistan.obama_1_new-strategy- 
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order to demonstrate how serious the coalition was in their desire to end 
civilian casualties in Afghanistan, the leadership on the ground made it clear 
that the United States would not drop any ordnance if there were a single 
civilian present.6 The unintended consequence of this self-inflicted lawfare 
included civilians being taken hostage, used as human shields, and or mur-
dered by the Taliban, as well as more coalition deaths, and the ultimately 
perverse effect of eroding support.7 
Major General Dunlap stated a refined lawfare definition in his 
2009 Joint Forces Quarterly article as ―the strategy of using—or misusing—
law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational 
objective.‖8 With that said, Major General Dunlap encourages the use of the 
courts and views them as a healthy facet of lawfare. He firmly believes that 
court challenges to U.S. policy make us ―better and sharper‖ and that the 
United States should never be afraid of litigation.9 
II.  LAWFARE‘S EVOLUTION 
The question now is whether ―Dunlap‘s Lawfare‖ has evolved into 
something more than he envisioned. The term lawfare has become a catchy 
term when describing a bitterly contested divorce as a ―war‖ or child custo-
dy ―battle,‖ whereby the lawyers are cast as ―warriors.‖10 The term has also 
been employed by the political far right deriding any legal forums and or 
  
additional-forces-afghan?_s=PM:POLITICS (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (noting that the cam-
paign in Afghanistan cannot be won without the support of the Afghan people which means 
the United States cannot risk killing innocent civilians which would create more insurgents). 
 6 See Charles J. Dunlap, Collateral Damage and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Small 
Wars Journal (Aug. 13, 2007, 4:52 PM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/collateral 
-damage-and-counteri-1/  (―NATO would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians 
nearby‖). See also Hans de Vreij, NATO Plan to Reduce Afghan Casualties, Radio Nederland 
Wereldomroep (July 30, 2007) http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/ 
currentaffairs/nat070730mc-redirected (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (noting NATO Secretary 
General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer,announced, ―new measures intended to reduce the number of 
innocent victims in Aghanistan as much as possible.‖). 
 7 Bombing Afghanistan:  Afghan President Tells 60 Minutes That Too Many Civilians Are 
Being Killed, CBS News (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/25/60 
minutes/main3411230.shtml. Human Rights Watch military analyst Marc Garlasco stated 
that while United States estimates the civilian casualties before acting, the Taliban is also 
―targeting civilians‖ and ―shielding in people‘s homes.‖ Id. 
 8 Dunlap, Charles J. ―Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?‖ Joint 
Forces Quarterly, issue 54, 3rd quarter 2009, at 35. 
 9 Id. at 39 (explaining that ―[R]ecourse to the courts and other legal processes is to be 
encouraged.‖). 
 10 Alex Kapetanakis, Lawyers: The Courtroom Warriors, Helium.com, http://www.helium. 
com/items/213045-lawyers-the-courtroom-warriors (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (discussing 
trial lawyers at war in the courtroom).   
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procedures that they disagree with.11 In particular, this faction‘s two main 
objectives are to discredit international law and delegitimize their oppo-
nents—policy or otherwise—who use legal institutions as a tool.12 
First, their attack on international law is relentless as they deride in-
ternational tribunals and treaties. For example, several conservatives oppose 
U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), despite the support of every President since Ronald Reagan, 
the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Navy, to name just a few.13 
Their efforts are not merely honest disagreements, and can only be consi-
dered disingenuous fear mongering as they continually misrepresent what 
UNCLOS ratification will mean to the United States.14 One of the loudest 
arguments that defies reality is that the United States will surrender our so-
vereignty to the United Nations. In fact, it has been argued by many who 
understand UNCLOS in the United States that ratification would result in 
essentially a ―U.S. land grab‖ that would expand U.S. sovereignty and rights 
throughout the U.S.‘s maritime territory.15 
Second, the conservatives on the far right attempted the demoniza-
tion and de-legitimization of lawyers who either oppose policy positions or 
directly represent individuals that they determine are not worthy of repre-
sentation—particularly those involved in Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) deten-
  
 11 See, e.g., Scott Horton, State of Exception:  Bush’s War on the Rule of Law, HARPER‘S 
MAG., Sept. 2007, at 75, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0081595 (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2010) (arguing that the Bush Administration‘s policy of attacking writ of 
habeas corpus lawyers of Guantanamo Bay detainees was a type of lawfare by Conserva-
tives). 
 12 See, e.g., Brooke Goldstein, Adjunct Fellow at Hudson Institute, International And 
Domestic Legal Recourses: Responding to Lawfare and the Goldstone Report (Apr. 27, 
2010), available at http://www.thelawfareproject.org/144/speech-delivered-by-brooke- 
goldstein-at-fordham (noting in a speech delivered at Fordham Law School on Lawfare and 
Combating the Goldstone Report the need to ―directly attack the credibility of the major 
players behind lawfare and call into question the authority these parties have been allocated 
to make and apply international human rights law.‖). 
 13 Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton accepted UNCLOS as customary 
international law with the exception of Part XI relating to ―deep sea mining.‖ The objection-
able Part XI was fixed with an additional agreement in 1994; Hearing on the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea Before the S. Commt. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 
(2003) (statement of Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr., USCG (Ret.)). 
 14 See Frank J. Gaffney Jr., U.N.’s Larger Role in UNCLOS is Bad for American Interests, 
12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 469, 473, 475–6 (2007–08) (noting Conservatives should be con-
cerned that with the UNCLOS the United Nations will be less accountable than it currently is 
and that the United Nations will usurp U.S. sovereignty). 
 15 See Benjamin Friedman & Daniel Friedman, Bipartisan Sec. Grp., HOW THE LAW OF 
THE SEA CONVENTION BENEFITS THE UNITED STATES 1, 5 (2004). The UNCLOS would help 
the United States protect marine resources, the environment, and shipping lines while ex-
panding U.S. Continental Shelf claims by 290,000 square miles. See also George V. Galdori-
si, Treaty at a Crossroads, U.S. NAVAL INST PROCEEDINGS, July 2007, at 52.   
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tion issues. A prime example is in 2007, when the then Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Charles ―Cully‖ Stimson, made 
statements questioning who was funding the lawyers for GTMO detai-
nees—implying some nefarious financial backing—as well as calling out 
CEOs to make law firms choose between representing their company or 
terrorists.16 
Is this lawfare? No, because this is essentially a war against law and 
not the use of law to achieve an objective. In this context, the term lawfare 
has become ―code‖; mere mention of the term connotes an entire argument 
for conservatives (Neo-Cons in particular) for all things international law 
and those who represent alleged terrorists. The use of code words in politics 
is not new and examples include terms such as ―activist judges,‖ ―Obama-
care,‖ and ―mainstream media.‖17 Lawfare cannot be allowed to become the 
new ―judicial activism,‖ whereby where you sit is where you stand. After 
all, those who cry ―activist judge‖ the loudest are those who disagree with 
the decision in the same way the victors extol the judges‘ wisdom and fi-
delity to the Constitution. 
The bottom line is that the conservative lawfare argument is in ac-
tuality a public relations campaign and not a legal argument. The far right 
faction is making a policy argument that challenges the Constitution. Alter-
natively, conservative lawfare advocates vilify the courts and lawyers who 
stand for unpopular positions. David Frakt refers to it as ―lawfear‖ whereby 
the entire phenomenon is invented in order to scare people.18   
III.  THE RULE OF LAW 
Nearly every nation on earth employs lawyers to aggressively prac-
tice international law in order to further national interests. A legitimate 
question is whether lawfare has become a term of art for any attempt to 
achieve one‘s national interests through a legal avenue. In other words, is it 
  
 16 See Top Pentagon Official Calls for Boycott of Law Firms Representing Guantanamo 
Prisoners, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 17, 2007), http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/17/top_ 
pentagon_official_calls_for_boycott (quoting a transcript of a Federal News Radio 1500 AM 
broadcast where Charles Stimson, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee 
affairs, suggested that prominent law firms had to chose between ―representing terrorists or 
representing reputable firms‖, Stimson noted that he was ―shock[ed]‖ that the major law 
firms in the United States were involved in the representation of Guantanamo detainees.). 
 17 See generally, Robert E. Goodin & Michael Saward, Dog Whistles and Democratic 
Mandates, THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Dec. 21, 2005, at 471, 471, available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2005.00708.x/pdf (arguing dog 
whistle politics merely resurrects a common practice that sends divergent code messages to 
different audiences). 
 18 Lt. Col. David Frakt is a law professor and former military defense attorney who han-
dled a writ of habeas corpus claim for a former Guantanamo prisoner. See About Us, David-
Frakt.com, http://davidfrakt.com/aboutus.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). 
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all just the normal application of international law, but as soon as it is mi-
sused, or used against your interests, does it then become lawfare? 
From the U.S.‘s perspective, the rule of law offers a powerful me-
chanism to end violence and the U.S. cites what it considers positive exam-
ples, such as the use of law in an attempt to solve issues in Kosovo, Cyprus, 
and Northern Ireland.19 The United States hails bringing the murderer 
Charles Taylor to justice in the Special Court for Sierra Leone and considers 
the announcement of his indictment, as prosecutor David Crane plainly puts 
it, as the use of law as a weapon system.20 The United States led the charge 
in establishing the international tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwan-
da (ICTR), whereby major powers were using the ―blunt instrument of the 
law‖ to force lesser powers to toe the line.21 But is any of the aforemen-
tioned lawfare? Lawfare cannot simply consist of any effort to enforce in-
ternational law generally and international criminal law specifically.  
On the other side of the ledger, one could argue that negative exam-
ples of the use of law exist when nations cynically use the international 
community‘s desire for the establishment of the rule of law as a way to ad-
vance their own standing in the court of world opinion. Examples include 
Cambodia‘s manipulation of the international community while negotiating 
the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC), the Burmese junta‘s new constitution, and Sudan‘s fragile North-
South Comprehensive Peace Agreement as a means of quieting criticism 
about the genocide in Darfur. Are these aforementioned examples of law-
fare because in each case the nations have manipulated or exploited the in-
ternational legal system in order to supplement military and political objec-
tives? Lawfare cannot be, nor was it intended to be, a subjectively negative 
endeavor. 
  
 19 Hillary Clinton, Sec‘y of State, U.S. Congratulates Northern Ireland on Progress To-
ward ―Lasting Peace‖, FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, May 17, 2010, at 107, available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7744764&jid=FPB&volum
eId=20&issueId=02&aid=7744756. 
 20 David Crane, The Take Down: Case Studies regarding ―Lawfare‖ in International 
Criminal Justice:  The West African Experience, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 201, 206 (May 
2010). 
 21 Interview by Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep‘t of State with Stephen J. 
Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (June 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/remarks/143178.htm (explaining that the Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal has limited effectiveness because it is expensive to prosecute more than 
three or four cases in each situation). 
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IV.  STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
Some scholars have expanded the definition of lawfare to include 
an element of what generically can be termed ―strategic communications.‖ 
Some of those definitions include Lawfare as:  
[A] weapon designed to destroy the enemy by using, misusing, and abus-
ing the legal system and the media in order raise public outcry against the 
enemy
22
 . . . [and] the exploitation of real, perceived, or even orchestrated 
incidents of law of war violations being employed as an unconventional 
means of confronting a superior military power.
23
 
Dunlap rejects the notion that lawfare can be reduced to ―a mere 
component of a glorified propaganda campaign‖ because, although lawfare 
is often misunderstood, it is ―a richer and far more complex concept.‖
24
 He 
states that ―the behavior of militaries is more than simply a public relations 
problem; it is a legitimate and serious activity that is totally consistent with 
adherence to the rule of law, democratic values, and – for that matter – 
lawfare.‖
25
 Despite Dunlap‘s protestations, it is worth exploring lawfare in 
the strategic communications context. 
Strategic Communications are the focused U.S. Government 
processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, 
strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests 
and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, 
programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national pow-
er.
26
 Strategic Communications relies on the supporting capabilities of Pub-
lic Affairs, aspects of Information Operations principally Psychological 
Operations, Military Diplomacy, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and 
Visual Information.27   
  
 22 Susan Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of ―Lawfare‖, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 29, 
31, (2010).   
 23 Id. at 52.   
 24 Dunlap, supra note 4, at 148.   
 25 Id. 
 26 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13 INFORMATION OPERATIONS I-10 
(Feb. 13, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13.pdf.    
 27 While not mentioned as a supporting capability of Strategic Communication (SC), the 
role of Military Deception (MILDEC) should also be understood in relation to PA and SC. 
See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION (SC) EXECUTION ROADMAP 3 [hereinafter ―Roadmap‖], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDRRoadmap20060925a.pdf. MILDEC consists of ac-
tions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision-makers as to friendly military 
capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to arrive at specific 
false deductions. See also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Joint Publication 3-13 Information 
Operations II-2 to II-3 (Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ―JP 3-13‖], available at http://www.fas. 
org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13.pdf.   
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Public Affairs (PA) includes public information, command informa-
tion, and community relations activities directed toward both the external 
and internal publics with interest in the DoD.28 Whereas Information Opera-
tions (IO) are the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electron-
ic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 
deception, and operations security in concert with specific supporting and 
related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human 
and automated decision-making while protecting our own.29  Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPs) are the ―planned operations to convey selected truth-
ful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emo-
tions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
PSYOPs is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to 
the originator‘s objectives.‖30 PSYOPs may be directed only at foreign au-
diences. Public Diplomacy includes overt international public information 
activities of the U.S. Government designed to promote U.S. foreign policy 
objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign au-
diences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between 
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.31 Defense 
Support to Public Diplomacy are coordinated interagency activities and 
measures taken by DoD components, not solely in the area of IO, to support 
and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the U.S. Government.32 Military 
Diplomacy includes the activities and measures U.S. military leaders take to 
engage military, defense, and government officials of another country to 
communicate U.S. Government policies and messages and build defense 
and coalition relationships.33 Finally, Visual Information refers to the use of 
one or more of the various visual media with or without sound, principally 
Combat Camera.34 
  
 28 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-61PUBLIC AFFAIRS GL-5 (May 9, 
2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_61.pdf (citing DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS (Apr. 12, 2001 amended through Aug. 19, 2009) [hereinafter ―JP 3-61‖], 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf).   
 29 JP 3-13, supra note 26, at GL-9. 
 30 Id. at II-1 (emphasis added). 
 31 Id. at GL-11 (citing JP1-02, supra note 26). 
 32 Id. at II-10. 
 33 See DEP‘T OF DEF., QDR EXECUTION ROADMAP FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 3 
(2006). 
 34 Id. 
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Joint Staff Policy directs that PA and IO activities must remain sep-
arate while remaining aware of each other‘s activities for maximum effect.35 
To that end, organizational constructs that integrate PA and IO offices may 
compromise the commander‘s credibility with the media and public and 
should be avoided. PA Officers should work directly for the Commander.36 
Specifically, ―there must be close cooperation and coordination between 
PSYOP and PA staffs in order to maintain credibility with their respective 
audiences,‖ however, their activities and products must remain separate and 
distinct.37 Additionally, while PA should not be involved in the provision of 
false information, it must be aware of the intent and purpose of MILDEC in 
order not to inadvertently compromise it.38 Deception and disinformation, 
while part of larger IOs through MILDEC, play no role and are not a part of 
DoD strategic communication efforts.39 Strategic Communication imple-
mentation measures must be cognizant of these established, separate lanes 
of responsibility between PA and IO; however, these lanes should not be 
seen as impediments to effective Strategic Communications. 
In the U.S. context, Strategic Communications must be legal and 
truthful. For example, it is legal to broadcast that ―Saddam is a tyrant and a 
murderer who does not want what is best for Iraq and Iraqis.‖ Whereas, it 
would be illegal to broadcast that ―Saddam will eat your children!‖ 
A prime example of strategic communications has been displayed in 
the Philippines. For the past several years, the United States has assisted the 
Philippine military in the southern islands of the Philippines in their cam-
paign against terrorists.40 When a terrorist bombing took place at a market 
that killed civilians, the Philippine and U.S. allies sent out a text message to 
thousands of mobile phones informing them of the fact that it was a terrorist 
attack that caused the deaths and provided a warning of other potential 
threats.41  
  
 35 Memorandum from Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army et al. 1–2 (Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://www. 
defenseimagery.mil/default/learning/vipolicy/misc/articleParagraphs/0/content_files/file/CJC
S%20PA_IO.pdf. 
 36 Id.; see also JP 3-61, supra note 27, at III-20. 
 37 JP 3-13, supra note 26, at II-2; see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-
53: DOCTRINE FOR JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS I-9 (2003) [hereinafter JP 3-53]. 
 38 JP 3-13, supra note 26, at II-3. 
 39 Compare JP 3-61, supra note 27 (describing strategic communications that will not 
involve deception and disinformation), with JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-
13.4: MILITARY DECEPTION (2006) (outlining the policy of military deception) [hereinafter JP 
3-13.4]. 
 40 See Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG (Apr. 27, 
2005), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-philippines.htm. 
 41 Interview on file with author. 
File: noone 2 Created on:  12/26/2010 4:43:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:10:00 PM 
82 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43:73 
Does lawfare include the misuse of legal terminology? For exam-
ple, filming an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) boarding of a Gaza bound 
blockade runner in the dark and stating that the IDF are violating interna-
tional law.42 Often times a film like this is replayed without legal analysis 
and becomes akin to the news cycle in politics of half-truths, rumors, and 
outright lies. Once it is put into play, it becomes reality and when the truth 
emerges at a later time, it is barely a story because the news organizations 
are embarrassed that they did not do prior due diligence.  With that said, 
lawfare should be reserved for the use of law and not simply the propaganda 
value of saying that ―they are violating law‖ or ―we are following the law.‖ 
Let us examine a step-by-step process of an effective strategic 
communications or lawfare operation: 
1. The Set-Up. Firing upon US troops in Fallujah from the minarets of 
mosques.  A clear International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violation.2. The 
Bait. The U.S. may return fire in a proportional manner in accordance with 
IHL.3. Record it. Several conspirators are positioned to digitally record 
and preserve the response.4. Strategic communications. Distribute the re-
cording via the internet, news, recruiting DVDs.5. Lawfare. Take the rec-
orded ―evidence‖ to a judicial forum under false pretenses. 
Both steps four and five could erode the necessary domestic support 
that any conflict requires. Vanderbilt Law Professor Michael Newton dis-
cusses such a phenomenon in an article reconsidering reprisals.43 However, 
his analysis is on point here as well:   
At worst, the current legal uncertainty emboldens terrorists because, while 
humanitarian law belongs to the armed forces of the world and imposes an 
inalterable professional obligation, the legal lacunae permit terrorist in-
formation operations to make it into a media tool to be manipulated and 
sensationalized. The incoherence in explaining sovereign responses to ter-
rorist acts permits the legal structure to be portrayed as nothing more than 
a mass of indeterminate subjectivity that is nothing more than another 
weapon in the moral domain of conflict at the behest of the side with the 
best cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant media accomplic-
es. There is a very real danger that terrorist video tapes and leaked state-
ments can create manipulation of an all too willing international media and 
therefore mask genuine violations of the law with spurious allegations and 
misrepresentations of the actual state of the law.  Failure to articulate the 
correct state of the law in turn feeds into an undercurrent of suspicion and 
politicization that erodes the very foundations of humanitarian law.  At the 
  
 42 See Marc Champion & Margaret Coker, Turkish Charity Says Its Dead Are Martyrs, 
WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, at A8; Colum Lynch, Israel’s Flotilla Raid Revives Questions of 
International Law, WASH. POST, June 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2010060102934.html; Brian Stelter, After Sea Raid, Duel-
ing Videos Carry on Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A1. 
 43 Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 361 (2010). 
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very least, the current legal framework allows terrorist organizations and 
their sympathizers to portray state responses as legally questionable.
44
 
Ultimately however, there is a difference between using the law in a 
lawfare context and using the media—defined broadly to include all kinds 
of electronic forms—to paint your enemies in a negative light. 
V.   ARE THERE LEGITIMATE / LEGAL AND ILLEGITIMATE / ILLEGAL FORMS 
OF LAWFARE? 
Step five in the process above involves taking the recorded ―evi-
dence‖ to a judicial forum under false pretenses. Is there a legitimate or 
legal lawfare that is permitted versus an illegitimate or illegal lawfare that is 
an un-permitted construct? An example of legitimate or legal lawfare comes 
in the form of excessive coastal state maritime and airspace claims and it 
results in a lawfare response by the United States with Freedom of Naviga-
tion Operations (FON Ops).45 Excessive maritime claims are an attempt to 
claim more national territory and to grow customary international law over 
time in favor of one‘s national interests. There are scores of excessive mari-
time claims worldwide, including Vietnam‘s excessive straight baselines, 
Peru‘s two hundred nautical mile territorial sea, and China‘s placing of sol-
diers on rocks in the South China Sea to make sovereignty claims, turn 
those rocks into ―islands,‖ and claim the resulting additional water rights 
that comes with an island designation.46 The United States conducts FON 
Ops against friend and foe alike, whereby U.S. Naval vessels conduct op-
erational assertions challenging the claims in order to act as a persistent 
objector and ensure freedom of navigation for the international community. 
But do the recipients of such FON Ops agree that they are legitimate or le-
gal and if not, does it matter? Who defines what are illegitimate or illegal 
forms of lawfare? And if it is deemed illegitimate or illegal does it maintain 
the term lawfare? 
Could this be operationalized as a ―ruse‖ versus ―perfidy‖ con-
cept?47  If so, it should be in accordance with the IHL because any attempt 
  
 44 Id. at 367–68. 
 45 See Military Operational Issues, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, www.state.gov/t/pm/iso/c21539. 
htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2010). 
 46 See BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INT‘L ENVTL. AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES 
DEP‘T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 112, LIMITS IN THE SEAS: UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE 
NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 13–14, 35 (1992); see also Mark Landler, Offering to Aid 
Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands, N.Y. TIMES, (July 24, 2010) at A4. 
 47 Ruses are lawful and include the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and mi-
sinformation. Whereas, perfidy is unlawful and in accordance with Additional Protocol I of 
the Geneva Convention.  
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to construct something outside of existing IHL could potentially have the 
debilitating effect of diluting the effectiveness of IHL.  The following ex-
amples are illegal and are clear violations of IHL and therefore, in this au-
thor‘s opinion, should not be considered lawfare.  The Taliban have killed 
civilians and dumped their bodies at Allied strike sites, especially in places, 
such as Pakistan, where it is hard to insert U.S. verification teams in an ef-
fort to blame the United States for civilian casualties.  The Iraqi leadership 
in the first Gulf War placed two fighter jets next to the Temple Ur in the 
hopes of an attack that would damage the mosque for public relations pur-
poses in order to continue to play the ―West is attacking Islam‖ card.  In the 
second Gulf War, hundreds of mosque minarets  were used by gunmen in 
order to attempt to achieve the same public relations effect.   
But what about the infamous al-Qaeda ―Manchester‖ manual that 
encourages terrorists to claim torture and mistreatment at the hands of the 
government? Or the numerous reports about Taliban detainees that imme-
diately claimed they were tortured in an effort to slow down the process and 
drain manpower. Finally, where does the ―Forced Cell Extraction‖ that may 
be required due to a detainee‘s refusal to leave his cell for a health or safety 
inspection fit in.48 After all, it is an attempt to gain an advantage at some 
time in the future. The guards videotape all such extractions in order to keep 
a record but the event has been orchestrated by the detainee to get it on vid-
eo so that it may potentially be taken out of context later. Where would 
these scenarios fit in the legal or illegal construct? Dunlap, in his 2008 Yale 
article, seems to recognize that all of the aforementioned scenarios, includ-
ing the IHL violations, are lawfare—albeit a  negative form of lawfare—and 
reflect the facts of modern war.49 He does not posit a legal versus illegal 
construct but instead uses this information as yet another reason why the 
  
Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to, or is obliged to accord, 
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with in-
tent to betray that confidence shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are ex-
amples of perfidy: (a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or 
of a surrender; (b) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; (c) 
The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and (d) The feigning of protected 
status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral 
or other States not Parties to the conflict. 
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1979 U.N.T.S. 
3, 21. 
 48 See, e.g., Prisoner’s Case Reveals Force-Feeding Tactics at Guantánamo Bay, DALLAS 
NEWS (Oct. 25, 2008), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/ 
DN-striker_25int.ART.State.Edition1.4ad63d0.html. 
 49 Dunlap, supra note 1, at 148–50. 
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military judge advocates are ―an indispensible part of the commander‘s war 
fighting team.‖50 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Lawfare is here to stay and is worth fighting for as a useful concept. 
Lawfare allows for using the courts but perhaps a cumulative approach to 
the legal system as a matter of practice as opposed to a matter of merit (e.g. 
false detainee abuse claims or frivolous lawsuits). In theory, this distinction 
should be examined as falling outside of lawfare and not simply as a ―nega-
tive form‖ of lawfare. However, in practice that would be nearly impossible 
to police and although there are real and important harms that can be caused 
by those who abuse the law and have no interest in justice—the harm would 
be greater if access to the courts is limited. In tandem with that thought is 
the fact that there always must be push back against those who demonize 
lawyers and the courts. After all, as Major General Dunlap clearly states, 
lawyers, particularly JAGs, are trying to advocate the use and understanding 
of the law and especially need to emphasize the pragmatic utility of the law 
to military commanders in an ideologically neutral way. 
 
  
 50 Id. 
